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Introduction
Committee decision making constitutes a long-standing concern of political scientists.1 Congressional committees have received a great deal of attention,2 but committees at other levels of government have not escaped notice. Generally, it is fair to say that committee research is stronger on the empirical side than on the theoretical. The primary emphasis lies on understanding a specific committee and perhaps the larger political system (e.g., Congress) within which the committee exists. Only a secondary emphasis lies on formulating generalizations which could be applied to committee situations removed from those studied. And seldom is a committee study regarded simply as a data source against which broad theoretical generalizations could be checked.3 lack of contact between mainstream political science and the technical literature is the difficulty in evaluating the latter. The models embody a curious mixture of positive and normative concerns. They are developed and advanced without a hint of possible operational definitions-one can find proof upon proof, but one searches in vain for a detailed discussion of exactly how and when a model should be applied. By relying, almost solely on logical validity, the technical literature has spawned many generalizations. But applied scientists simply cannot tell which of these might be usefully employed in field research. And they have neither the inclination nor the training to familiarize themselves with them all.
If theorists blithely continue to prove more theorems, and applied scientists doggedly continue to gather more data, at some point data and theory might miraculously conjoin. But we regard such a union as more likely to result from a determined effort than from a fortuitous accident. We have begun a program of research intended to bring together formal models and actual behavior. In this paper we report on the initial section of our work, a program of experimental research into the decision processes of small committees operating under majority rule.
We are quite aware of (and even share) the discipline's skepticism about the usefulness of experimental methods. What makes us believe, for example, that we can use college students to simulate the behavior of Congress members? Nothing. Our beliefs are much more modest. We intend to use the laboratory as a screen for basic ideas: if a given model does not predict well relative to others under a specified set of conditions in the controlled world of the laboratory, why should it receive preferential treatment as an explanation of non-laboratory behavior occurring under similar conditions? While laboratory success by no means implies field study success for a model, laboratory failure raises grave doubts about a model's applicability in field studies. Thus, while we reject the suggestion that the laboratory can replace creative field researchers, we do maintain that it can help them decide which ideas deserve further consideration.
There are a number of other problems which we do not wish to avoid. Rather than raise them in an introduction, however, we prefer to consider them in the light of what we have done. Thus, additional discussion of our particular brand of experimental methodology appears in the concluding section of this article.
The Committee Process
We constructed the experimental setting to be a simplified case of the general class of committees which we wish to understand. This class of committees is defined by four conditions: a. Individual committee members are not uncertain about the consequences of any committee decision, i.e., they fully understand the effect which alternative committee decisions will have on them.
b. Committee members have clear, constant preferences over the objects of the committee decision. The committees are making decisions about things that matter to them. They are not solving problems or making judgments about things for which they have no personal preference.
c. There is no previously fixed parliamentary procedure other than minimal rules of order and majority rule.
d. There are no extra-committee agreements or private deliberations among subsets of committee members.
Basically, we wish to explain what goes on within the "black box" of committee decision making. We focus on the period after biological, sociological and psychological processes have operated to instill clear preferences in committee members. The question then is simply how a committee whose members have clear, conflicting preferences arrive at a decision in the simple institutional setting we create. Clearly, the political world we have designed lacks the institutional complexity of more naturally occurring political committees, and it is possible that the existence of alternative conditions might induce behavior different from that which occurs in our simple situations. But we believe that our experimental design captures the essence of the basic majority rule committee process. And, as it turns out, for this most basic committee process several models work quite well indeed, while many other proposed models do not work at all. City College, California State University at Los Angeles, and Los Angeles City College.5 They were recruited from the classes of cooperating instructors and in cafeterias and other areas where students congregate. Each subject was permitted to participate in only one experimental session. Post-experiment conversations with instructors and subjects indicated that the subjects were cooperative in declining to discuss the experiment with outsiders after participating. Thus, subjects generally knew little or nothing about the experiment before reading the instructions.
Recruits were asked to appear at a designated time and place. At the maximum, four experiments were conducted simultaneously (20 subjects) but a few extra subjects always were recruited in order to assure the necessary number. Extras were paid $2.00 for time and trouble and dismissed (none was permitted to observe). Once the recruits were assembled, assignments to committees and assignments to positions within committees were determined randomly. After reading the instructions (Appendix A) each committee went to a separate meeting room where deliberations immediately began.
Experimental Setting. The substance of the decision was simple. Each committee was asked to select a single point on the blackboard by majority rule. A coordinate system was drawn on the blackboard and each subject was assigned a payoff function defined over ordered pairs of the coordinate system. That is, subject i was assigned a payoff function Ui(x 1,x2), i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, which indicated the amount of money he or she would receive from the experimenter expressed as a function of the point, (xl,x2) chosen by the committee. (See Appendix B for an example, and Appendix C for all functions.) The instructions clearly stated that no threats, side-payments or postexperiment deals were permissible. In fact, our instructions prohibited any discussion of monetary amounts.6 So as long as individuals prefer 5An occasional working adult (e.g., gardener, secretary) appeared among our subjects. Our subjects included members of racial minorities and women. We are aware that some social psychologists prefer subject populations to be racially or sexually homogeneous. But the class of models in which we are interested gives us no reason to differentiate among blacks, whites, chicanos, men and women. 6This restriction serves two functions. First, it enhances control over the experiment. Outside deals which induce preference changes in subjects but not in more money to less, their preferences for points on the blackboard are represented7 by the functions LP(x1,x2).
This setting seems to assure that our committees were of the type designated by conditions (a) and (b) in section 2. There appears to be little uncertainty and, as long as the functions Ui(xl,x2) have adequate slope, there is no general indifference. The method of recruitment assured that condition (d) was satisfied. This leaves only (c) open to operational question.
The committees made their decisions under a simple set of parliamentary procedures. Each committee began at the point (200, 150). That is, the status quo in each experiment was the extreme northeast point in the issue space. Upon recognition by the chair (experimenter), any subject could propose an amendment (no second required) to the motion on the floor. If it passed (possibly following discussion in sessions where discussion was allowed), the amendment became the new motion on the floor and the process continued. At any point during the experiment a motion to end debate was in order. If a majority consented, the motion on the floor was then voted up or down. If the motion passed, the experiment ended, and if it failed, the floor was again thrown open for amendments. Thus, each of our committees pushed a point around the blackboard until a majority voted to quit and go home.8 Subjects were paid in cash at the the models are made difficult to negotiate. Furthermore, social stigmas regarding monetary endowments which also can induce uncontrolled preferences are minimized when monetary amounts are not public. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, a cardinal measure of returns is not a general property of a broad range of committee processes. As in our experiments political decision makers can learn the order in which their fellow decision makers regard alternative proposals. They can attempt to communicate intensity through anger, other displays of emotion, and effort. But objectively given cardinal measures of returns are generally absent. 7For all (xl, x2) and (x'1, x'2) we know that (xl, x2)Ri(x'l, x'2) if and only if U1(xl, x2) > UO(x'L x'2). So the binary relation Ri is the preference relation. The 40 experimental sessions of Series 1 were divided into 4 subseries of 10 experiments each. The high-payoff condition employed payoffs similar to the example contained in Appendix B. The low-payoff condition specified much lower maximum payoffs and a smaller rate of loss as the outcome departed from the maximum. Appendix C gives full details. The communication condition varied from full communication-in which subjects could talk about anything they wished, other than the monetary aspects of their preferences-to no communication. In the latter condition subjects could do nothing except make proposals and vote.
As discussed below, Series 1 confirmed the initial hypothesis that low-incentive committees and high-incentive committees behave substantially differently. Because the models with which we are most familiar were most applicable to the high-payoff case, and because the communication condition seemed to make little difference in this case, we chose to follow the high-payoff, full-communication path in the remainder of our experiments. Series 2 and 3 were both constructed to discriminate among models which gave identical, accurate predictions in the high-payoff case in Series 1. The logic behind these particular designs is explained in the following section.
Competing Models. Given our simple setting, there are a remarkable number of potentially applicable models which differ from one another in their assumptions about the behavior patterns of committee members. Although these models are motivated by reasonably well-articulated theories, it is often unclear how these theories apply to our situation, if at all. Thus, of necessity, we have taken the liberty of identifying predictions which incorporate the spirit of the respective theories. Possibly we have erred. If so, we invite aggrieved parties to correct us.
We have divided the available models into two broad classes according to the nature of the motivating theory. The theories which lie behind the first class, called egoistic, have the common view of decision makers as selfinterested maximizers, while the second class, non-egoistic, presupposes that committee members look beyond their individual interest to some type of collectively optimal, or consensus outcome. Egoistic theories can be subdivided further into four classes: game-theoretic, coalition-theoretic, voting-theoretic, and finally, agenda-based voting-theoretic. Egoistic: Voting-Theoretic. These models purport to specify which outcome will be adopted by a group of individuals each of whom votes sincerely, i.e., in accord with his or her personal preferences. 12To draw a theoretical distinction between the formally equivalent concepts of core and voting equilibrium might strike some of our colleagues as unnecessary hair-splitting. To these skeptics we address one further point. In the typical case in which no core/equilibrium exists, where does one turn? If one has arrived at the core through the game-theoretic literature, one naturally turns to some other gametheoretic concept such as the N-M solution. But if one has arrived at the equilibrium through the votingtheoretic literature, one turns to some other votingtheoretic model such as the min-max set or an agenda theory. When it exists, the core/equilibrium is the intersection of several branches of theory. But that is not to deny that these branches are distinct. Egoistic: Agenda-Based Voting-Theoretic. The agenda procedures used by a committee can influence if not completely dictate the decision.1 5 This fact raises the possibility that there is some "natural" agenda which committees tend to use even if it is not formally specified. A general model of committee decisions would be interpreted as having two steps. First, there would be a prediction about which agenda the committee would adopt, and then, secondly, a prediction about how the committee will behave once an agenda has been adopted. take it that the implemented decision will be the "center" of the formed minimal winning coalition. There are ten such coalitions, so the model predicts that the outcome will be one of the ten points labeled E on 21Qbviously, our procedures (no communication of monetary amounts) work against any theory which specifies that the committee or a subgroup of it tries to achieve a group maximum (models 12 and 13). Of course, the political world also works against any such theory in that cardinal measures of preferences which group maximization theories presuppose are typically not available (footnote 3). And even if objectively known monetary payoffs are available, there still is no theoretical justification for asserting the equivalence of a maximum of group monetary payoff and group utility payoff. But for reasons discussed under model 13 we can not dismiss out-of-hand models which contain group or subgroup maximization processes.
Egoistic

Voting Equilibrium. Introduced by Black and formally developed by Plott and
Non-Egoistic. These theories have in common the premise that principles more general than individual selfishness explain group decision making. We content ourselves with four possibilities. "prominent" or "obvious" place to goperhaps other than one of the points outlined above? In each series there is one individual maximum in the interior of the convex hull of the individual maxima. We take the point A in Series 1 and Series 2 and point B in Series 3 as the obvious point predictions.
Maximum Group
Experimental Results
Series 1. The Series 1 design affords an opportunity to make a first broad cut among the numerous models discussed in the preceding section. The design is such that the egoistic voting-theoretic, agenda-based voting-theoretic and game-theoretic models conflict with the egoistic coalition-theoretic and non-egoistic models. As mentioned above, pilot experiments suggested that both payoff size and amount of communication affected experimental outcomes. Thus, although most of the candidate models say nothing terribly precise about these variables, a class of models might possibly work well under one set off payoff/communication conditions, but not others. For example, we anticipated that the entire class of non-egoistic theories would perform better with communication and with low payoffs. Conversely, restricted communication and high payoffs would appear to maximize the chances of a good performance by certain of the egoistic theories. Thus, we conducted 40 experiments, 10 each in the 4 combinations of low/high payoffs, no/free communication described in section 4. Table 1 Table 1 suggests rather strongly that when individuals have a good deal at stake, one had better model their behavior via a theory which includes point A among its predictions. The Series 1 high-payoff experiments provide grounds for rejecting models 9-15, in favor of 1-8, 16. Moreover, the Series 1 results also suggest a subtle way of distinguishing between models 1 and 2, and models 3-8. Note that the point, A, appears equally good as a prediction in both the communication and noncommunication cases. This apparently supports the view that the processes driving the results are more likely to be similar to those underlying the voting-theoretic models than to those underlying the game-theoretic models, given that the latter seem to presuppose coalitions and joint strategy choices, i.e., a generally high degree of communication and coordination.
What about the low-payoff experiments? When full communication is permitted, the mean outcome is much farther to the right (47, 72) than in the high-payoff condition. Some committees attempt to accommodate the extreme individual.25 Thus, charity or altruism apparently has its price and in these experiments, that price lies somewhere between a few cents and a few dollars per unit. When communication is not permitted the mean outcome is similar to that in the high-payoff case, although the variance is much higher. Thus, there is an interaction between communication and payoff conditions, with the difference between the payoff conditions being less in the absence of communication.
Overall, though, the differences in payoffs appear to be a more significant influence on the outcome of the committee process than differences in communication. Given high payoffs, the egoistic theories work equally well with or without communication. Given low payoffs, all 25lnterestingly enough, this seeming altruism has an ironic twist. Subjects often made the incorrect assumption that their payoffs were identical. But the asymmetry in payoff structures (Figure 2 ) leads to the result that if Players 1, 2, 3 heeded the pleas of Players 4 and/or 5 to move farther north and/or east than the equilibrium, then the fringe players got significantly more in absolute terms than the more centrally located players, although the outcome remained relatively closer to the latter. The American Political Science Review Vol. 72 the models work rather poorly with or without communication. The best of a bad lot of models in the low-payoff condition are the "agenda manipulator" and the "dominant personality" models-8 of 20 outcomes fall on individual ideal points. Strangely, though, 5 of these 8 outcomes occur in the no communication case where the operation of personal factors presumably is minimal. Thus, the agenda manipulator appears to be somewhat more plausible than the personality theory. In addition to experimental outcomes, there are other more impressionistic findings to report. As one would expect, behavior in the experiments differed between the communication and non-communication conditions. In the HP non-communication condition subjects proposed and voted on amendment after amendment (mean 28). In the communication condition the subjects made fewer official amendments (mean 16) but actually considered many more informally. Subjects often became quite involved with the decision in the communication condition. They cajoled, pleaded, sometimes wrote on the board, invented fair division schemes (usually consistent with their own self-interest) and generally created an interesting and enjoyable observational context for the experimenter. Frequently "leaders" emerged in the communication condition. These were people who took it upon themselves to gather and organize information from the other subjects and "work out" an acceptable decision. Contrary to naive expectations, these individuals did not generally do better than non-leaders. Coalitions were very rare in the Series 1 experiments. On only a handful of occasions did we observe a subgroup of the committee arrive at a decision without regard for the wishes of the remaining committee members. The atmosphere of the experiments tended to be friendly and cooperative; irritation sometimes showed, but seldom did personal animosity surface. Even suggestions about coalitions (e.g., "let's end it; we've got the votes") typically were rebuffed by one or more committee members. Perhaps if we were to encourage subgroups of our committees to bargain privately we might find more coalitional activity, but for the experiments reported, we must conclude that coalition theories do not provide a basis for explaining either the committee processes or outcomes.
Committee Decisions under Majority
Finally, we found it interesting that subjects sometimes resorted to intellectual short-cuts such as satisficing in our experiments (e.g., "I drew this square around my ideal point and voted against anything outside of it and for anything inside"). In these experiments each subject's preferences were clearly laid out with dollars and cents figures available for each comparison of alternatives. Nevertheless, some subjects opted for simpler ways of making a decision. In the real world such difficulties are compounded. How many of us know that our preference for one Defense Procurement Bill is 3.62 and for another, 3.95? How much more likely are rule-of-thumb intellectual short-cuts in such situations? Interestingly, nearly all the formal models of committee decision processes assume away costs associated with gathering information, identifying one's preferences and reaching a decision. Yet these factors loom very large in the experiments. In the low-payoff condition the experimental atmosphere might best be described as: "Choose any reasonable point and let's go." Perhaps some concept of decision-making costs together with the equilibrium considerations that receive reasonable support in the high-payoff experiments will explain the differential Series 1 and 2 results. Series 2. Having found three classes of models which meet with some laboratory success (egoistic game-theoretic, egoistic voting-theoretic and agenda-based voting-theoretic), we elected to continue with the high-payoff experiments and attempt to make some finer distinctions among models 1-8. Moreover, given (1) that the full-communication committees are empirically more common, and (2) that communication did not appear to make much difference with high payoffs, we also elected to continue with only full-communication experiments.
As seen in Figure 2 , Series 2 differed from Series 1 in the arrangement of the individual maximums and more importantly, in the shapes (elliptical v. circular) of the induced indifference contours. These changes provide the opportunity for a conclusive contest between models 1-4, 6, and 5, 7, all of which made identical predictions in Series 1. In Series 2 however, model 5 (city block) predicts B with coordinates (72, 66). Model 7 predicts points C with coordinates (63, 66) and (72, 61). Models 1-4, and 6 predict A with coordinates (61, 69). Table 2 contains the experimental outcomes for Series 2, while Figure 6 illustrates them. The results are clear. The mean outcome is (60, 72) with a standard deviation comparable to that for Series 1. Thus, the earlier success of models 5 and 7 proves to be illusory. When their predictions coincide with models 1-4, 6, they are upheld. When models 1-4, 6, make a different prediction, models 5 and 7 fail to Two other points deserve mention. First, we now see that the Series 1 results cannot be attributed simply to the existence of a transitive, majority-rule-preference relation in that design, i.e., the fact that every sequence of proposal adoptions eventually leads to the core or equilibrium. In Series 2 cycles exist. Thus, not every sequence of proposal adoptions will necessarily lead to the core or equilibrium. Second, notice the occurrence of non-Pareto optimal outcomes in Series 2 (2 of 10). Such "social wastage" conflicts with coalition theoretic reasoning, and indeed, with all the fundamental ideas of cooperative game theory. In contrast, such pathologies are not uncommon in voting-theoretic models. The American Political Science Review Vol. 72 tion. As we mentioned, however, the concept of coalition, on which such solution theories depend, appears foreign to our experimental decision makers. Thus, observation of the experiments clearly aids in their explanation. In this section we report on a third series of experiments which were partially motivated by some puzzling phenomena which occurred in Series 1. Consider Figure 7 . This figure shows the path" taken by a committee in reaching a decision. The committee in Figure 7 made six moves. Note that although the committee ended up near (39,68), at some point they were exactly on it but left. According to models 1-4 the impossible happened. Thus, looking only at the experimental outcomes would lead us to a more positive appraisal of these models than would an examination of the experimental dynamics: the phenomenon illustrated in the figures is not uncommon.
How does one explain the kind of process shown in Figure 7 Evidently, however, this pessimistic natural hypothesis induced by McKelvey's theorem is not operating in our experiments. In Series 1 the existence of an equilibrium is associated with a tightly clustered set of outcomes centered on the equilibrium. But in Series 3 the nonexistence of an equilibrium is not associated with experimental chaos. We did not notice any behavioral differences in the conduct of the two series; in particular, subjects in Series 3 appeared to have no greater difficulty in reaching a decision than did those in Series 1. Perhaps some general theory exists which could explain both Series 2 and 3. If some as yet undeveloped theory is driving the Series 3 experiments, it had better specialize to the equilibrium/core when the latter exists. The min-max set (model 4) is one such theory, but it really does not do very well: of 15 Series 3 outcomes, only 3 are contained in it.29
In sum, Series 3 both settles and raises questions. On the one hand the pattern of results leads us to believe that model 16 is not driving the Series 1 results, that the existence of an equilibrium in Series 1 makes a real difference. On the other hand, the pattern of experimental findings does not explode, a fact which makes us wonder whether some unidentified theory is waiting to be discovered and used.
Conclusions
What have we learned from the research just described? What we expected to learn changed during the course of the project. We began with the presumption that none of the models found in the literature could survive a careful experimental evaluation, that our experimental committees would produce outcomes "all over the map," so to speak. In all candor, we suspected that formal models of committee processes had little to recommend them other than logical rigor. This negative presumption went by the board rather quickly-after a few pilot experiments, in fact. Some of the models actually appeared to work. Thus, our task changed from the easy one of generating negative results to a more difficult and painstaking one of determining why some models work, and when. This necessitated careful specification of the available models and careful design of experiments capable of differentiating among them. This conclusion summarizes the results of our first efforts, our thoughts about the significance of our results for existing theories, and the relevance of our results for applied research. This answer implies several additional conclusions and raises some interesting additional questions:
Implications for Basic
(1) Numerous widely known models which have natural interpretations in this setting do not work. Applied scientists who wish to study situations falling within our specifications should not look to these models for help. Table  4 The first argument simply asserts that "real" politicians are different from student subjects. Moreover, the argument runs, such differences are fundamental and do not merely reflect the more complex contexts in which professionals operate. This argument suggests that were we to conduct our experiments using state legislators as subjects, the experimental results would differ systematically and significantly from those previously obtained. In principle one could check the validity of the criticism by replicating the experiments using professionals as subjects. We have not done so, and therefore have no real defense against this first argument. We did use a relatively heterogeneous subject group and we encourage others to explore the bounds of the results across other populations.
The other two arguments emphasize the fact that naturally occurring political committees do not exist in splendid isolation. Instead, they are frequently embedded in some larger ongoing institutional context. This embedding raises the following potentially critical question: if the committee decision is regarded by the members as only one stage in a sequence of games, might behavior in the committee reflect strategic considerations from the larger game? If so, a model which explains the behavior in the larger game might produce implications for the committee stage which differ substantially from those implied by models successful in explaining the processes of isolated committees.
The preceding argument raises an obviously important consideration: behavior in interdependent, sequential decisions might reflect laws and principles different from those underlying behavior in isolated decisions. On balance, we think this second argument makes a convincing case for not extrapolating our results too quickly to the larger political world. We make the following observation, however. One can gradually (and carefully) complicate a research design to make it more analogous to real-world political processes. By doing so, we are effective only when moved together-precisely the kind of variation not allowed in the controlled laboratory environment. This view must be taken seriously, and ultimately there is only one convincing rejoinder, the same that an experimentalist in the physical sciences must give to a critic who claims that the laws which operate in test tubes or other laboratory environments differ from those which operate in the "real world." One can only point to laboratorygenerated information which has been helpful in field or engineering endeavors. Granted, experimental social science has not yet progressed to such a level, but we are optimistic that it eventually will. can determine whether the complications destroy the applicability of models which work in simpler contexts. If they do, we stand a good chance of both identifying the precise complications which do the damage, and modifying the models to incorporate such complications. Thus, we do not take the second argument as a criticism of what we have done or of experimental methodology in general. Instead, it suggests that more experimental work needs to be done. We agree.
A final, third class of arguments also emphasizes the complexity and interdependence of naturally occurring political processes. Even if a model applies in principle to a naturally occurring situation, there may be no practical way to apply it. In laboratory studies we have easy access to the relevant parameters. How, in the "real world" where there are old friendships and enmities, established working relationships, debts, etc., does one identify the alternative space and the preferences over that space? For example, through exhaustive interviews and some suitable scaling technique we might construct a policy space in which a congressional committee, school board, etc., is presumably operating. Perhaps we could even approximate preferences over this space. Even so, the argument runs, isn't the policy space only a tiny subspace of the larger alternative space which includes all the aforementioned complicating factors? Clearly this is an empirical question. Answers to such questions can only come from the experience (yet to come) of trying to apply the models within the limits of prevailing measurement technology. The limits of the practical are constantly changing, presumably in a positive direction. To reject an applicable model because of the current practical difficulties of using it seems short-sighted, if not foolish.
The preceding arguments should make us cautious about assuming correspondences between laboratory and naturally occurring political behavior. But neither separately nor in combination do these arguments negate the existence of those correspondences. The important thing is to resist the temptation to leap prematurely from the laboratory to the field. That transition should come through slow, well-chosen steps based on a carefully designed program which integrates theory, laboratory and field research. 
